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A SURVEY OF CONTEMPO- 
RARY PSYCHOLOGY 
A DETERMINATION of the date 
marking the beginning of modern 
psychology is bound to be an arbi- 
trary one. Authorities would doubtless 
differ with any attempt in that direction. 
However, it seems to the writer that a 
study of the history of the development of 
psychology during the last century will dis- 
close a rather sharp change of objective, or 
perhaps one might better say a crystallizing 
of opinion, in the seventies of the last cen- 
tury. In the year 1874 there were published 
in Germany two books which had a pro- 
found influence upon the thinking of psy- 
chologists both in Europe and in America. 
These books were Principles of Physiologi- 
cal Psychology by Wundt, and Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint by Brentano. 
At the time of the publishing of these 
books psychology had been waging for 
about twenty-five years a war with philos- 
ophy for its independence, as, in fact, most 
bodies of knowledge had to do at one time 
or another. Philosophy always objected 
strenuously to the separation from itself of 
any body of knowledge. While the content 
of the two books was different and differ- 
ently treated, both can be credited with a 
large part in the final break with phil- 
osophy. 
Although Wundt and Bretano differed in 
many beliefs, they had the following points 
of view in common : 
1. Psychology should hold a high place 
in scientific thought. 
2. It should know the mind before the 
natural sciences. 
Author's Note :—This paper does not attempt 
to discuss the various technological phases of 
psychology, such as social psychology, education- 
al psychology, or comparative psychology, import- 
ant as they are. 
3. It should give up the idea of mental 
substances for mental phenomena. 
4. The unconscious should be given up 
as a method of explanation and psychol- 
ogists should stick to observables. 
5. Consciousness should be regarded as 
a unit. In this, both differed from Her- 
bart. Here the likeness ends. 
Brentano differed from Wundt in his ap- 
proach to psychology in that he believed it 
a matter of argument while Wundt regard- 
ed its method as descriptive. As to the 
material of psychology, Brentano thought 
of it as including only the purely psychical 
He divides all psychology into three parts: 
1. ideating—sense-perception. (I see or I 
understand.) 
2. judging—(I believe.) 
3. feeling—(I hate, or desire, or love.) 
He believed psychological content to be 
that of imminent objectivity, that is, that 
there is always an object for every mental 
act. His was the psychology of the mind in 
use, or, as it has been most frequently 
called, act psychology. The following sen- 
tence will illustrate his position : 
I remember I saw blue. 
(act) (act) (content) 
Brentano refused to accept content, rele- 
gating that to the realm of physics. 
To Wundt the phenomena of life and life 
itself are one, but may be observed from 
different points of view. From one point of 
view it may be biological, from another, 
psychological. Herbart and Kant had said 
that psychology could never become an ex- 
perimental science. Wundt held out the 
promise of an experimental science in his 
method of observation. Observation may 
be said to be the basis of experimental 
science. 
Wundt felt that the best way to break 
with philosophy was to show results, con- 
crete facts, that would justify psychology 
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as a separate body of knowledge. This he 
tried to accomplish by setting up the follow- 
ing methods of study: analysis, synthesis, 
and explanation. Although persuaded that 
objective observation was the most fertile 
approach to the subject, he drew heavily on 
introspection as a method peculiar to psy- 
chology. Sensation and feeling were the 
only two elements he recognized, but by the 
turn of the century image was recognized 
by most psychologists and thought and will 
by a few. Wundt, then, is classified as a 
content psychologist. 
The following diagram, Fig. 1, illustrates 
the development of psychology from 1874 
to the present time. Reference to it as the 
article proceeds will help the reader follow 
the development. 
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Figure 1—Diagram representing the develop- 
ment of the various schools of psychology since 
1874. 
As soon as psychology gained recognition 
as a separate science, the common cause 
that had, at best, held the psychologists to- 
gether half-heartedly was now wiped out 
and they began breaking up into separate 
and frequently conflicting schools. 
Existential Psychology 
Existential psychology developed from 
the experimentation of Wundt, Titchener 
being its strongest exponent in America. 
Titchener puts his whole trust in experi- 
mentation and in observation, both intro- 
spective and objective. He also used as 
methods analysis, synthesis, and explana- 
tion. The components of mental activity 
which he lists are sensation, image, affec- 
tion, relational perception, and thought. His 
experimental work might be called psycho- 
plrysical, most of it being in the realm of 
sound, light, mass, time, and space. In 
fact, he said his field was the world of ex- 
perience and it depended on the viewpoint 
whether it was physics or psychology. For 
example, mass in physics is constant; a 
gram is always a gram; but in psychology 
mass is not so easily dealt with. If one 
takes a large bottle and a small one, fills the 
large with water and the small with mer- 
cury until both weigh exactly the same, the 
smaller one will feel much the heavier. 
Kulpe, head of the experimental laboratory 
at Wurzburg and author of Outlines of 
Psychology, 1893, considered by many to be 
the best book on psychology ever written, 
added to the elements mentioned above, 
duration and extensity. Wundt and Tit- 
chener, about the same time, but independ- 
ently, added the element of vividness. Up- 
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The term existential is the newer term, 
structural being the original title suggested 
by James in 1880 and accepted by Titchen- 
er in 1889. Structural or existential psy- 
chology is systematic and represents a re- 
finement of technique over former methods 
in psychology. 
Functional Psychology 
After psychology became established as a 
science, dissatisfaction arose concerning the 
sterility of the results of structural psy- 
chology in its benefits to mankind. Many 
psychologists were not satisfied for the sub- 
ject to develop into a science to be studied 
for itself alone. Also, according to Wundt, 
it offered no way to attack the problems of 
the higher processes of the mind. The 
criticism of structural psychology was that 
it was merely descriptive. On the other 
hand, the functionalists claimed as the basis 
of their psychology "the mind in use." 
That is, the purpose of psychology was not 
only to describe processes, but to show how 
they could be used. 
Angell was a fair representative of the 
functional school. Dewey in his early years 
wrote a psychology from the functional 
point of view. James, if he belonged to 
any school, was a functionalist. The fol- 


















The functional point of view is that of a 
technology. Particularly did it emphasize 
attitude and its role in directing behavior. 
The structuralists claimed a function can- 
not be observed, only its consequence, there- 
fore functional psychology cannot be scien- 
tific. They also criticized it on the basis of 
its being like the old faculty psychology. 
This the functionalists denied and coun- 
tered with the charge that structuralism 
claimed to be all-sufficient when it was 
merely descriptive, allowed no way for the 
organism to adjust itself to environment, 
and was sterile as to its contribution to the 
welfare of mankind. And so the battle 
went on, sharply, but, in the main, in a 
friendly manner. 
This difference of opinion reached its 
peak about the turn of the century and was 
dying out, each group broadening its beliefs 
and accepting more and more of the ideas 
of the other, when Watson announced his 
position on behaviorism. Strictly speaking, 
we have neither structural nor functional 
psychology today. 
Behaviorism 
R. S. Woodworth, in a radio address in 
the fall of 1931, humorously defined a 
school of psychology as "a red-faced, loud- 
voiced group of men who are attacking a 
traditional position." Karl Dallenbach also 
made the comment that "a movement al- 
ways thrives by attacking some other posi- 
tion, calling it old and worn-out, and then 
over-emphasizing its own virtues. 
While we think of John B. Watson as the 
center of the behavioristic movement, we 
must remember that late in the nineteenth 
century arose a group of psychologists in 
Germany called "Objectivists who tried to 
interpret behavior entirely separated from 
mental behavior. So also Pavlov and Bekh- 
terev in Russia developed an objective psy- 
chology in their studies of conditioned re- 
flex. However, Watson crystallized the 
movement and has been regarded, and prob- 
ably rightly so, as the founder of the school. 
In 1913 he stated that he could no longer be 
content to work with intangibles, and al- 
though he was a product of functional psy- 
chology, his quarrel was more with that 
school than with the structuralists. He set 
up a program which outlined a psychology 
based solely on the biological sciences and 
rigidly excluding every reference to con- 
scious states or processes. 
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Watson's doctrine may be considered 
from two points of view, positive and neg- 
ative. 
Positive Aspects 
1. Object—Universal and objective psy- 
chology. 
2. Aim—Utilitarian. To predict and con- 
trol behavior. 
3. Data—Concerned only with changes 
in the muscles and glands. 
4. Point of view—Adjustment to envir- 
onment. 
5. Descriptive categories—Stimulus and 
response, and heredity and environ- 
ment. 
But, as we said before, for a system to 
thrive it appears that it must attack the old 
system, so a negative side of Watson's po- 
sition was set up. 
Negative Aspects 
Watson claimed that all psychologists 
have been able to accomplish to date is to 
substitute consciousness for soul. This is 
illustrated in his first negative aspect. 
1. He ignored the work of former psy- 
chologists as having nothing to offer 
modern psychology. 
2. He denied 
(1) Consciousness. Since conscious- 
ness cannot be perceived with 
the senses it must not exist. He 
also denied its use. 
(2) Introspection. He said that in- 
trospection cannot grapple with 
such things as perception, judg- 
ment, reasoning, and imagination, 
and as a method of observation 
was not scientific. 
(3) Sensation. All one has, accord- 
ing to Watson, are receptors af- 
fected by certain stimuli and giv- 
ing off certain responses. 
(4) Memory. Only a muscular or 
glandular learning. Simply an 
ability to perform an act that has 
been performed before. 
(5) Image. All images are either 
muscular or visceral habits. 
(6) Thought. He says it is simply an 
implicit muscular or glandular ac- 
tivity, that is, activity that takes 
place but cannot be seen, as in 
movements of the larynx in sub- 
vocal talking. In other words, 
thought is nothing more than sub- 
vocal talking and should be ob- 
served objectively by measure- 
ment of the muscular reactions 
of the larynx. 
(7) Pleasantness and unpleasantness. 
Merely tumescence or detumes- 
cence of the sex organs and other 
erogenous zones. 
(8) Instinct. Watson first believed 
in instincts (1914), but gradual- 
ly lost this belief. In 1919 he 
was critical of them, and in 1924 
he denied them entirely. "In the 
list of human responses there are 
no such things as instincts." 
Hence it follows that there are no 
inherited capacities or tempera- 
ments. This led him to say 
in his book, Behaviorism, 1924, 
page 120, that if you would give 
him any normal child, he could, 
with proper environment and 
training, make him into "any type 
of specialist I might select—doc- 
tor, lawyer, artist, merchant chief 
and, yes, even beggar-man and 
thief, regardless of his talents, 
penchants, tendencies, abilities, 
vocations, and race of his an- 
cestors." So far as I know, no 
other psychologist has attempted 
to out-bid him in this respect. 
(9) Emotion. Watson denies the con- 
scious side of emotion. He leans 
toward the Lange theory, which 
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is largely visceral in its interpre- 
tation. His three elements of 
emotion are fear, love, and rage, 
but his definitions of these are 
not orthodox at all. To him they 
are just certain responses in the 
neuro-muscular system, most of 
which are the results of condi- 
tioned reflex. 
While Watson's behaviorism grew out of 
the functional school, it is more like struc- 
turalism. He analyzes behavior into its 
simplest components, the reflexes, from 
which concept he evolves his situation 
bond—response symbols. 
Pavlov's conditioned reflex concept really 
went farther than Watson's situation—re- 
sponse concept in that it provided not only 
for the biologically adequate stimulus, but 
added the indifferent or substitute stimulus 
to produce the same response. And this 
was in 190S. Watson adopted the concept 
of conditioned reflex very slowly. In 1914 
he merely mentions it. In 1919 he gave it 
an important place in behavior, especially in 
emotion. In 1922 he said it was the key to 
all behavior. In 1930 he called it the key- 
stone in the arch of behavior. As instincts 
waned the conditioned reflex waxed. 
Watson's behaviorism may be criticized 
on four points. First, he is not historical. 
His idea is not at all as revolutionary as he 
claimed it to be. Comte rejected introspec- 
tion in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, Charcot criticized it in 1851, 
Thorndike in 1911 defined psychology as 
the science of behavior, as did also Pills- 
bury. Second, he was logically irrelevant. 
Behaviorism is not a new psychology, as he 
claimed, but simply a new chapter of the 
science. It cannot replace all the rest. 
Third, he is not consistent. He denies many 
of the precepts of psychology and then ad- 
mits them under another name, as for ex- 
ample, introspection, which he kicked out 
the front door and then admitted through 
the back door as verbal report. Fourth, he 
promised much but gave little. About 
eighteen years has passed since Watson, 
first announced his system. What has it 
achieved? It can't lay claim to originating 
objective observation as a method of study- 
ing psychology, for that method was in use 
before the beginning of the twentieth cen- 
tury. Nor can he claim to have eliminated 
introspection, for psychologists still con- 
tinue to use it and are making important 
contributions through its use. Woodworth 
says he has probably helped to simplify 
some sections of psychology and helped on 
their way to oblivion some unpsychological 
problems inherited from philosophy. 
We would certainly be misleading in our 
discussion of this school if we failed to 
mention other behaviorists beside Watson, 
or perhaps it would be better to say other 
"behaviorisms." The reader is referred to 
K. A. Williams's article, "Five Conflicting 
Behaviorisms," in the American Journal of 
Psychology, July, 1931. Other psychol- 
ogists who would certainly rank as behav- 
iorists are Max Meyer, W. S. Hunter, and 
K. S. Lashley, all of whom differ in import- 
ant ways from Watson. 
Gestalt Psychology 
About 1910-11 the controversy over im- 
ageless thought which had been raging for 
several years petered out. The whole con- 
troversy contributed nothing to psychology. 
Kbhler and Koffka, who at that time were 
in the University of Frankfort, Germany, 
were imageless thoughters who realized the 
futility of the controversy and left it. To- 
gether with Wertheimer, who was also 
working at Frankfort, they revolted against 
some of the concepts of orthodox psychol- 
ogy, especially that of analysis and associa- 
tion. They founded their own school, 
which they called Gestalt psychology, as a 
protest against these older conceptions. This 
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was about 1912, which you will note was 
about the same time Watson delivered him- 
self of his first pronouncement concerning 
behaviorism. However, the World War 
coming on shortly afterward prevented 
either doctrine making any headway in the 
country of the other. The Gestaltists at- 
tacked the existentialists and behaviorists 
on the concept of analysis, so a three-cor- 
nered fight developed. The existentialists 
did not get excited over the controversy. 
They objected only to annihilation and, like 
"old man river," just kept rolling along. 
But as a new school must have something 
to attack, this new school—like that of the 
behaviorists—set up the straw man of in- 
trospectionism which they called existen- 
tialism. Introspection is, of course, not a 
school at all, but one of the methods of the 
existential school. 
On the negative side Gestalt psychology 
protests against: 
(1) Analysis, which they call atomism. 
(2) The constancy hypothesis, that is the 
fallacy of assuming a one-to-one re- 
lationship between situation—re- 
sponse in behaviorism or stimulus— 
sensation in structuralism. 
(3) Past experience, attention, attitude, 
or set. They say psychologists have 
not been able to explain satisfactorily 
any of these concepts. 
(4) Association. Gestaltists object to try- 
ing to integrate or associate relative- 
ly unrelated stimuli or sensations. 
"What is the mechanism that holds 
them together?" they ask. 
On the positive side Gestalt psychology 
develops: 
(1) Concept of wholeness. This is real- 
ly the cardinal doctrine of Gestalt. 
A whole or pattern, whether mental 
or physical, has about it qualities 
which are not present in the mere 







Figure 2—Diagrams illustrating various laws 
suggested by Gestalt psychology. 
geometrical figure "a square" (see 
[a] Figure 2) has about it qualities 
which are over and above the sum of 
its four straight lines. 
(2) The law of pragnanz. This law may 
be divided into several smaller classi- 
.fications, namely: 
(a) the law of closure. According 
to the law of closure, objects 
tend to complete themselves, 
that is, if a figure is drawn leav- 
ing small gaps in it, one tends, 
when observing the figure, to 
perceive it as a perfect figure. 
Orthodox psychologists would 
explain this as the result of past 
experiences, but the Gestaltists 
believe that it is due to some in- 
ner brain dynamics in receiving 
a mass of stimuli from the ret- 
ina. The brain process tends to 
spread across the gaps. The 
brain seems to respond to fig- 
ures as a whole. Difficulties in 
proofreading might be explained 
on this basis. To the Gestalt 
psychologist an imperfect figure 
produces unbalanced brain ten- 
sions while a complete figure 
produces equilibrium, therefore 
the brain gravitates toward com- 
pleteness. 
(b) the law of figure and ground. 
Our tendency is to interpret 
figures in terms of their back- 
grounds. Every pattern exists 
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as a figure against a more gen- (d) the concept of insight. As stat- 
eral and usually more vague ed previously, the Gestaltists say 
background, but this background that the whole is more than the 
has almost as important a part sum of its parts; so it cannot be 
to play in the final perception of gotten by observation of its 
the complete pattern as has the parts, but by a sort of sense- 
primary figure itself. In a land- perception of a combination of 
scape, the size of the tree in the conditions which they call an in- 
foreground is determined large- sight. 
ly by the size of the other trees The Qestaitists objected to Thorndike's 
in the background or by the size experiments in animal learning, because, 
of the building it may be partial- ^ anj[mai never saw the whole 
ly hiding. In the auditory field combination 0f conditions at any one time. 
a bar of melody stands out The s;tuat;ons were, in other words, blind 
sharply against the background situat;onS) aS; for example, the maze used 
of noises made by the orchestra so frequentiy by Thorndike, and were not 
tuning up. Nor are any of at any one time present in their entirety be- 
these parts of the landscape or £ore tbe senses of the animal. If they had 
music isolated elements, but part and ££ tbe problems had not been out- 
and parcel of the whole pattern. ^ the range of the abii;ty of animals of 
(c) the law of movement. Werth- the dass use(^ they woujd have learned, not 
eimer experimented with sense- by trial an(i error) t0 use Thorndike's ex- 
perception by throwing upon a pressionj but by insight. These assump- • 
screen in a darkened room al- t.ons by Koffka and Kohler were drawn 
ternating slits of light (see [b] iargeiy from their experiments with anthro- 
Figure 2), one lying slightly be- poid apes_ Qf the many experiments, one 
low the other and parallel to it. only may be merltioned in this paper. An 
It would be expected that the ^ .n a cage made 0f p0ies planted far 
observer would see two parallel enough apar1; to allow him to get his arm 
lines, one lying below the other thr0Ugh is presented with the situation of a 
and lagging somewhat behind banana lying outside the cage and out of 
the first as to time of appear- reach of tbe ape,s arm> There is also out- 
ance. As a matter of fact, what s.de the cage> but w;tbin reach of the ape, a 
the observer actually sees is a ,pbe ape^ after making many attempts 
single line oscillating upward to reacj1 tbe banana with his arm alone and 
and downward. Again if these 0btaining absolutely no success, seems about 
slits of light meet to form an to ^.ve up when aj1 at once and without de- 
angle and are again alternated, ^ be tat,es bold of the pole and with it 
the image appears as a single „ tbe banana within reach of his arm. 
line rotating back and forth on thereafter he does it without error. 
an axis. This is not ue, says Tbere js n0 gra(}ual improvement in the 
Wertheimer, to the brain first . A < Tin^rnrlilr^'c: 
analyzing the image into two P^cess as is represented by Thorndikes 
lights and then synthesizing curves of animal learning (see [c] Fig 2), 
them into movement, but to ac- but a sudden insight and the total step from 
tually sensing them as a moving zero success to one hundred per cent suc- 
image. cess- 
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Criticism of Gestalt Psychology 
1. Their protest against analysis is great- 
ly exaggerated. They claimed they 
would abolish all analysis. But all 
scientific method includes analysis. 
They now admit analysis, but surrep- 
titiously. They say their type of an- 
alysis is not real analysis, but a differ- 
ential analysis in the same sense as 
we speak of differential calculus. Not 
analysis into real elements, but into 
pseudo-elements. In this they seem 
to be inconsistent. 
2. They attributed to opponents assump- 
tions which these opponents did not 
make. An example of this is in the 
law of constancy, which means a one- 
to-one correlation or, translated into 
the situation—response hypothesis, 
that a certain stimulus will always 
produce the same response. The Ge- 
staltists deny this and try to pin it on 
their opponents. The truth is that no- 
body believes it. An illustration of 
their argument may be seen by exam- 
ining [d] Fig. 2, Four dots arranged 
in the pattern in the figure may be 
seen in any of the forms following it 
in the figure. This very example 
which they use to disprove the con- 
stancy theory convicts them in another 
of their denials, which follows. 
3. They deny past experience, attention, 
and attitude. Now the only way the 
above phenomenon of interpreting in 
various ways one visual image may 
be explained is by past experience, at- 
tention, or association. But all these 
they deny openly. 
4. They deny association and substitute 
for it Gestalt or configuration. But 
what is a Gestalt? They say it is a 
primitive dictum of knowledge. In 
easier terms, it is perceiving a situa- 
tion as a whole instead of first per- 
ceiving the parts and through these 
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arriving at the whole. Dallenbach 
■ says it is just our old friends past 
experience and attitude back again. 
Undoubtedly Gestalt psychology has 
something to offer to psychology in general. 
It has directed our attention with new in- 
terest on insight as a method of learning. 
Also it has emphasized the integrative func- 
tion of perception. It is rather interesting 
that Gestalt psychology has had a better re- 
ception in America than in the country of 
its birth. 
Purposive or Hormic Psychology 
We have a purpose in sight for most of 
our behavior, although many psychologists 
seem to have ruled out this common sense 
idea. Wundt and Brentano both had a pur- 
pose in making psychology scientific; Tit- 
chener's purpose was to develop a descrip- 
tive psychology, and Watson's purpose was 
to make it a natural science. Even the 
strictest objective psychologist has a pur- 
pose in his observations and experiments. 
Purpose as a motivating force in mental 
life has been recognized by most of the psy- 
chologists who are not definitely aligned 
with the behaviorist or Gestalt schools. Mc- 
Dougall, however, in 1908 made it the car- 
dinal principle of his system. 
McDougall had a good background for 
his work in psychology. He had medical 
training at Cambridge and London, and 
worked with the great English psychologist, 
Sherrington, and with Muller, the leading 
exponent of the associationist school. 
Purpose, according to McDougall, means 
the urge or desire back of the act. Purpose 
implies, first, foresight and, second, desire 
for the outcome. Purposive psychology, 
therefore, is an outgrowth of act or func- 
tional psychology, as shown in the diagram 
presented earlier in this paper. 
The whole system probably grew out of 
McDougall's desire to find a psychological 
basis for the study of sociology. In 1908 
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he published his Introduction to Social Psy- 
chology. Up to this time psychologists had 
ignored motives in human conduct, but mo- 
tive is the great interest of the sociologist. 
Since orthodox psychologists seemed unable 
or unwilling to aid the sociologist, there de- 
veloped various improvised, unscientific 
systems of psychology that seemed to throw 
light on the problems of sociology. So Mc- 
Dougall tried to write a social psychology 
that is both scientific and helpful in the 
study of motive. 
Instincts, he maintains, are the primary 
motives of life. He also links up emotions 
with instinct as a mental attribute. On the 
receptive side he says that instinct is a pre- 
disposition to certain types of stimuli; on 
the doing side, a predisposition to certain 
types of behavior in response to particular 
stimuli; and between these two phases there 
is an emotional tone which seems to be the 
core of the whole. 
These instincts with their various modi- 
fications resultant from environmental con- 
ditions carry all the urges necessary to so- 
cial life. The modifications usually occur on 
the sensory side by being attached to new 
stimuli very much as suggested by the psy- 
chology of conditioned reflex. These modi- 
fications take care of behavior that cannot 
be related directly to one of his pure in- 
stincts. The instincts may also be combined 
into sentiments, as, for example, patriotism. 
Behavior is driven by these sentiments rath- 
er than by pure instincts—especially adult 
behavior. Nor is thinking a great factor in 
behavior either individual or social, be- 
havior being more the product of instincts 
and sentiments. 
This psychology was received with en-' 
thusiasm by sociologists, but it did not go 
long unchallenged by psychologists, their 
main criticism being directed toward the 
term instinct. The existence of instincts 
cannot be demonstrated objectively; as the 
existentialists deal only with observation, 
they deny them. The behaviorists deny in- 
stinct because it goes against their mechan- 
istic point of view. If the present-day trend 
toward non-belief in the instincts becomes a 
finally accepted principle of psychology, the 
foundations of purposive psychology will be 
undermined. 
McDougall has never had a large follow- 
ing and the drift seems to be away from 
him, although he professed in 1930 to be 
getting more sympathetic recognition. His 
greatest following has been among the soci- 
ologists. 
Psychoanalysis 
While psychoanalysis will be discussed in 
this paper as a school of psychology, it can 
hardly be accepted as a scientific psychology 
in the sense in which we have been discuss- 
ing scientific psychology. To be a science 
of psychology or of any other field any body 
of material must present a large amount of 
data resulting from carefully controlled ex- 
periments. The conclusions drawn from 
.this material must be limited to that which 
can rightly be deduced from the experi- 
ment. Psychoanalysis, as far as the writer 
can determine, has neither kept such a body 
of experimental data, nor has it checked 
carefully its conclusions in the light of 
what little experimental data it has. 
Sigmund Freud, the originator of the 
theory of psychoanalysis, was interested 
originally in the study and treatment of ab- 
normality in human mental life. Together 
with Joseph Breuer, a Viennese physician, 
Freud developed a method of allowing a pa- 
tient troubled with emotional difficulties to 
"talk out" her difficulties to the physician. 
After gaining the confidence of his patient, 
Freud would urge her to discuss with him 
frankly all her emotional disturbances, not 
only her present ones, but others reaching 
even to her early youth, and including her 
dreams as well as her waking disturbances. 
This method plus one of free association re- 
sulted often in tapping the patient's mem- 
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ory of things apparently long forgotten and 
discovering the causes of her difficulties. 
The bringing to light of these causes of con- 
flict led to a release of pent-up emotions, 
the conflict terminated, and the mental 
health of the patient was restored. 
Freud had not practiced this method long 
until he was struck with the frequent occur- 
rence of dreams as a part of these free as- 
sociations. He made a careful study of 
dreams which resulted in his publishing in 
1900 his Interpretation of Dreams. To 
Freud dreams were expressions of wishes 
which had not reached fulfillment in the 
waking hours. Strivings that had been re- 
pressed and forced into what he called the 
"unconscious" found expression in dreams. 
Another continually recurring factor in 
the talking out, free-association method and 
in dream analysis was the sexual element. 
In fact, this element in time became the 
core of Freud's whole system. The sexual 
desires being repressed during the waking 
hours were freed during sleep, although 
even then they frequently appeared in dis- 
guise. Now while these dreams were some- 
times easy to interpret, such as the wish- 
fulfilling dream of finding money, usually 
they were so disguised as to be meaningless 
to one not practiced in the art of interpret- 
ing them. Freud in course of time built up 
a long list of dream symbol's which he 
claimed to be able to interpret, thus gaining 
light on the patient's repressions. 
Still another important development in 
Freud's system is that of transferrence. 
This means that the feeling of the patient 
for the object of his or her desire which 
was usually unattainable was transferred to 
the analyst or physician. This fact had in it 
much opportunity for complications which 
led some practitioners to give up the talk- 
ing-out method, but Freud claims to be able, 
after he has become the object of the pa- 
tient's desire, to reason away this desire. 
As most of the sex experiences or desires 
which Freud says are repressed and which 
later appear in some form or other to color 
our behavior are experiences which oc- 
curred in childhood or early youth, he 
makes these youthful repressions another 
important fundamental in the foundation of 
his system. Woodworth states Freud's 
fundamental doctrine as follows : 
"If we put the two theories together, we 
have in a nut-shell the fundamentals of 
Freud's psychology. Repressed infantile 
sexuality—we see at once that the three 
words could not be reduced anyhow to two, 
and that the edifice stands on three pillars 
instead of two. The importance of repres- 
sion, the importance of sex desire, and the 
importance of the infantile period, are 
Freud's three main emphases." 
Space will not permit a discussion of 
Freud's "polarity of the individual," his 
conception of the libido, or his Oedipus 
theory. 
It is hard to criticise the contribution of 
Freud on the basis of the criteria of. sci- 
entific psychology and be fair to him. It is 
more a technology of psycho-therapy. And 
yet even a technology is based on experi- 
mental facts. Freud has never kept any 
data as to his cures or failures. In fact, he 
might say that all were really cures if the 
patient probed deeply enough into his past 
experiences. We all have a habit of forget- 
ting failures. The best way to prevent this 
is to keep careful, accurate data. Had this 
been done in psychoanalysis, it appears that 
the per cent of failures would be found to 
be astounding. 
In most cults one person, sooner or later, 
becomes the leader and corners the market; 
such leaders are Mary Baker Eddy in 
, Christian Science, and Freud in psycho- 
analysis. They become a sort of oracle. 
Everything must be taken ex cathedra from 
them. Freud read Adler, Jung, and Wittels 
out of his system because they produced 
original ideas. There should be no corner 
on truth. 
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Probably the greatest contribution of 
Freud is in the field of neurosis. It is to 
him we owe the discovery that most neuros- 
es are due, not to emotional shock from out- 
side sources, but to ineffective attempts on 
the part of the individual to adjust his de- 
sires to the conditions of life. We must also 
credit Freud with directing attention to the 
much broader influence of the factor of sex 
in all phases of life both normal and abnor- 
mal. And last, Freud's investigations have 
shown to all thinking people who are ac- 
quainted with his work, the importance of 
normal, healthful childhood if we hope for 
normal, healthful adulthood. 
C. P. Shorts 
THE SCHOOL TAX PROB- 
LEM: A QUOTATION 
MOST of the higher learning in 
America is carried on in tax-sup- 
ported state universities. The sit- 
uation of all these public institutions is 
now so critical that unless there is some 
change in the attitude or condition of our 
people there is indeed very little hope for 
the continuation of that higher learning 
which is my theme. 
The principal function of the private uni- 
versities in the educational system is to pro- 
vide the leadership or the recklessness 
which shows the public institutions what 
they should or should not attempt. They 
have led the way in research and in educa- 
tional experiment and have demonstrated 
to the Legislatures that it is a good thing 
for the community to pay professors a liv- 
ing wage. 
Such payment is not charity which the 
professors should accept with humility and 
reward with silence on controversial issues. 
It is an investment in intelligence. The pri- 
vate universities have struggled to main- 
tain the right of the scholar to exeicise his 
intelligence even though it led him to criti- 
cize established policies or institutions. 
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Their example has enabled most state uni- 
versities to take the same position, with in- 
finite profit to their states. 
These spiritual values the private univei- 
sities will always have for the educational 
system as a whole. But their income, like 
that of other aggregations of capital, is now 
so much diminished that they cannot hold 
out much longer in their effort to present 
education and research in their proper eco- 
nomic perspective. 
Our people must, therefore, themselves 
believe that tax-supported education and re- 
search are important and must themselves 
determine to protect them. At the present 
time the ordinary American gives little evi- 
dence of any such belief or any such de- 
termination. We hear instead that the cost 
of government must be reduced. 
The Chance of Reduction 
Now, I do not believe that in the long 
run the cost of government can be reduced, 
or should be reduced, or will be reduced. 
Certain costs of government could and 
should be reduced. The total cost of gov- 
ernment could and should be redistributed, 
with certain items increased, and other 
items eliminated. 
The increases that we may expect in Fed- 
eral taxes to support the social services and 
to provide for the relief of the destitute are 
far greater than any reductions that can be 
accomplished by tinkering with bureaus. 
Even the savings that would come from a 
reduction in the army and navy and from 
limiting aid from the Veterans' Bureau to 
those who deserve it would be swallowed up 
by the new obligations which the Federal 
Government must assume as a result of the 
collapse of our industrial system. 
Take the case of education. The prin- 
cipal difficulty that our schools have had to 
face until this depression has been the tre- 
mendous increase in the number of pupils. 
This has been caused by the advance of the 
legal age for going into industry and the 
